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Abstract 
Trauma-exposed people commonly exhibit a “memory amplification” effect, endorsing 
exposure to more traumatic events over time. Studies reporting this phenomenon have 
typically relied on checklists, where participants read event descriptions and indicate 
(yes/no) their exposure. We examined whether that approach is vulnerable to response 
biases and memory errors. In two experiments, participants viewed negative photos and 
completed an Old-New recognition test. In Experiment 1, participants completed either a 
photo recognition test or description test—comprised of written descriptions of negative 
photos. In Experiment 2, we measured analogue PTSD symptoms and participants 
completed the description test twice, 24-hours apart.  The description-test condition 
performed worse on the memory test and were more biased to endorse negative photos 
compared to the photo-test condition. Further, this bias to endorse negative photos 
increased over time and was related to analogue PTSD symptoms. Overall, our findings 
suggest that test format plays a role in memory amplification.             
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Explaining memory amplification: Is it all about the test format? 
Victims of trauma often endorse exposure to more traumatic events over time: the 
memory “amplification” effect (e.g., Southwick, Morgan, Nicolaou, & Charney, 1997). For 
example, when responding to a list of traumatic event descriptions, a veteran may indicate 
that s/he has not experienced “seeing human remains” but later claim to have had that 
experience. Importantly, memory amplification appears problematic: it is consistently 
associated with Posttraumatic Stress Disorder symptoms (e.g., Engelhard et al., 2008; 
Southwick et al., 1997). Thus, understanding what processes lead to amplification, and why 
amplification occurs is critical. Discrepancies in reports may arise because participants are 
poor at distinguishing experienced and non-experienced events, a memory distortion 
process. Indeed, misremembering negative photos over time is associated with worse 
outcomes (Oulton, Takarangi, & Strange, 2016). However, discrepancies could also 
represent changes in how people interpret unaltered memories (Engelhard & McNally, 
2015); participants might reinterpret the sight of blood as “seeing human remains,” a shift 
in response bias. The typical test format to assess trauma exposure—sometimes vague 
event descriptions that might be considered subjective (e.g., “witnessing violence”; 
Engelhard et al., 2008)—may be especially vulnerable to reinterpretation. Of course, both 
distortion and reinterpretation processes may contribute to memory amplification. Here, we 
examined whether test format influences people’s ability to distinguish between 
experienced and non-experienced events, and/or their willingness to endorse them over 
time.  
Memory amplification occurs across various samples, including Vietnam veterans 
(King et al., 2000; Southwick et al., 1997), American peacekeepers (Roemer, Litz, Orsillo, 
Ehlich, & Friedman, 1998) and 9/11 disaster restoration workers (Giosan, Malta, 
Jayasinghe, Spielman, & Difede, 2009). In one example (Engelhard, van den Hout, & 
4  
McNally, 2008), Dutch Army soldiers reported whether they had been exposed to war-
related stressors (e.g., being shot at) at five months and 15 months post deployment. At 15 
months, most (70%) soldiers reported exposure to at least one stressor they never endorsed 
earlier. Importantly, soldiers with more PTSD symptoms overall made more no-to-yes 
response changes. Other researchers have found small, but significant correlations between 
PTSD symptoms at follow-up and number of no-to-yes changes over time: 0.20, 95% CI 
[0.16, 0.24] (Giosan et al., 2009), 0.23 [0.06, 0.38] (Engelhard et al., 2008), 0.26 [0.22, 
0.30] (King et al., 2000) and 0.32 [0.17, 0.60] (Southwick et al., 1997). 
One problem with field studies is that trauma exposure cannot be corroborated. 
Thus, we do not know whether memory amplification reflects an increase in memory 
distortion or another process, such as people underestimating events initially and 
responding more accurately at follow-up, or reappraising the significance or meaning of an 
event. They might also exaggerate reports in response to demand characteristics or to 
enhance their self-image as a brave and courageous person (knowingly or unknowingly). 
Indeed, some studies suggest that reports of combat exposure among veterans are 
sometimes exaggerated or misrepresent their true involvement (e.g., Frueh et al., 2005). We 
developed a lab-based paradigm to address the problem of corroboration (Oulton et al., 
2016). Participants viewed negative photos of graphic scenes (e.g., death and mutilation). 
Following tradition in cognitive research, participants then completed a standard 
recognition test—whereby participants identified photos as “old” (previously seen) or 
“new” (previously unseen)—on two occasions, one-week apart. Participants’ ability to 
distinguish between old and new photos (i.e., their sensitivity) decreased over time, but so 
did their tendency to endorse negative photos (i.e., response bias). However, mirroring the 
field research, among participants who remembered more photos over time, re-
experiencing symptoms were associated with an increase in “old” responses (r=.28). This 
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result suggests memory distortion at least partially accounts for amplification. 
Importantly however, our memory test format differed from the field research, 
which has typically administered checklists: participants read verbal descriptions of 
specific stressors (e.g., “seeing others killed or wounded” and “death of a close friend”; 
Southwick et al., 1997) and indicate (yes/no) whether they have previously been exposed 
(e.g., Giosan et al., 2009) and/or the extent of exposure on Likert-type scales (e.g., Roemer 
et al., 1998). When shown response discrepancies, participants typically explain that they 
interpreted items—or key words on the checklist—differently the second time (Engelhard 
& McNally, 2015). 
Could reinterpretation1 contribute to memory amplification? Engelhard et al. (2008) 
suggest PTSD sufferers are prone to subjective reappraisal; they make sense of their current 
symptoms by attributing those symptoms to stressors during service, thus events previously 
considered irrelevant gain importance. Further, Englehard et al. argue that PTSD sufferers 
can be unwilling or unable to determine whether something actually happened to them and 
hence prone to gist-based retrieval strategies. For example, a veteran who is experiencing 
severe PTSD symptoms might be less willing to search their memory for events during 
service—due to the distress the process provokes—and therefore likely to respond “yes” to 
any checklist item that seems perceptually or conceptually familiar. We wondered whether 
these strategies would be especially likely when verbal descriptions are used, as in the field 
research. Thus, in Experiment 1, we examined whether people would be more likely to 
falsely recognize photos or descriptions of those photos; and whether they would be more 
biased to respond “old” to new photos or new photo descriptions. Specifically, to separate 
people’s ability to discriminate between old and new photos (i.e., sensitivity)—which 
                                                        1 Of course, reinterpretation could occur in the opposite direction too. After a period of time and/or reflection, 
people might begin to doubt that events they experienced really occurred and hence make memory omission 
errors. This explanation would explain why field studies also find some yes-to-no errors over time. 
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depend on a memory trace’s strength—and people’s tendency to respond to “old” to test 
items (i.e., response bias), we used a signal detection approach (e.g., Stainslaw & Todorov, 
1999). 
Recognition judgments are based on two distinct mechanisms (e.g., Mandler, 1980): 
recollection—the specific retrieval of previously studied items—and a sense of familiarity. 
Certain factors—including how memory is tested—can affect how much each mechanism 
contributes to a given judgment. Thus we had competing predictions for sensitivity and 
response bias. Turning first to sensitivity, because participants in the photo-test condition 
see studied and test items in the same format, they might experience more difficulty 
distinguishing old and new test items, compared to those who study photos but are tested 
on descriptions. Indeed, people falsely recognize “new” (never seen) items more frequently 
when they are conceptually or perceptually similar to studied items (e.g.,“twister” vs 
“funnel”, Schacter, Verfaellie, & Anes, 1997; pictures of objects from the same category, 
Koustaal & Schacter, 1997). Thus, the overlap in perceptual information between study and 
the photo-test should lead to poorer sensitivity. 
Similarly, participants might show a bias to respond “old” to photos more than 
descriptions, because when viewing the test photos they rely on feelings of familiarity to 
make their judgments. Importantly, familiarity might arise for “new” photos, because they 
share perceptual features with previously encoded pictures, for example, leading to source 
monitoring errors: new photos judged to be “old” (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1997). 
Conversely, participants may question whether descriptions are accurate depictions of 
encoded photos and therefore respond cautiously, requiring more evidence to label 
description test items as “old”.  
However, because photos contain perceptually rich and specific information, they 
might constrain people’s ability to imagine new details, relative to descriptions. 
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Imagination lays the groundwork for false memory creation, increasing confidence an event 
occurred (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996) and producing clearer, more 
complete memories of false events (Scoboria, Wade, Lindsay, Azad, Strange, Ost & 
Hyman, 2017). Critically however, the mode of suggestion matters: false memories are 
more likely when participants receive the suggestion via a description compared to a photo 
(e.g., Garry & Wade, 2005). Therefore, participants may experience more difficulty 
distinguishing between old and new descriptions than between old and new photos.  
In relation to response bias, participants may be more liberal with descriptions, 
because they could describe more than the specific photo to which they are meant to refer. 
Israel and Schacter (1997) found that when people encoded images instead of words they 
were less likely to respond “old” at test. They argued that participants demand a distinct 
recollection of a test item before saying “old” if they see photos at encoding. Therefore, 
participants might respond “Old” according to how easy it is to retrieve a certain memory 
that fits with the description, or the degree of perceptual information that memory entails.  
In summary then, we had competing predictions; there are theoretical reasons to 
anticipate a memory advantage and liberal response bias towards both photos and photo 
descriptions. However, if photo descriptions lead to poorer sensitivity and liberal 
responding, our findings would suggest that test format plays a role in memory 
amplification. To test this idea, our participants viewed highly negative photos from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and, 20 
minutes later, completed an Old-New recognition test. Critically however, participants saw 
either a photo test—comprising seen and unseen negative IAPS photos—or a description 
test—comprised of written descriptions of seen and unseen negative IAPS photos. We 
compared participants’ sensitivity and response bias on the test between these conditions.  
Experiment 1 
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Method 
 
Participants 
 
We recruited participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: 228 participants2 
completed the Experiment (114 per condition). Participants were US residents, aged 19-74 
(M=34.57, 95% CI [33.12, 36.02]). Over half (52.2%) were male and most identified their 
ethnicity as Caucasian (including White; 72.4%). Other participants identified as African 
American (including Black; 7.5%), Hispanic (6.6%), Asian American (6.6%), European 
(3.5%), or mixed ethnic origin (3.5%). We did not collect any other demographic or 
socioeconomic data. 
Materials 
Trauma analogue. We selected 64 photos—53 IAPS3 photographs (Lang et al., 
2008) and 11 additional photos (from Krans, Langner,Reinecke, & Pearson, 2013)—
depicting negative scenes (e.g., violence and death). We divided photos into four sets of 16 
target photos, matched for mean valence, Fs < 1 (Set 1: M = 1.93, 95% CI [1.79, 2.06], Set 
2: M = 1.91 [1.69, 2.14], Set 3: M = 1.90 [1.69, 2.11], Set 4: M = 1.97 [1.79, 2.15]) and 
arousal (Set 1:M = 6.33 [6.12, 6.53], Set 2: M = 6.28 [5.85, 6.71], Set 3: M = 6.39 [6.03, 
6.76], Set 4: M = 6.36 [6.03, 6.69]). Participants saw three sets of photos (48 photos total) 
at encoding. We counterbalanced sets across participants such that each combination 
appeared equally. 
 Positive Affect Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). We measured positive and 
negative affect using the 20-item PANAS (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Participants                                                         2 We first ran a pilot study (N=92) to gain an estimate of Cohen’s D for the possible effect of condition on 
response bias. Based on a precision analysis using this information (Cumming, 2013), we predetermined a 
sample size of at least 220 participants (110 per condition) to obtain a target margin of error (i.e., the half 
width of the target confidence interval) of 0.29. 3 IAPS photo numbers: 2352, 2703, 2800, 2811, 3005, 3063, 3064, 3069, 3080, 3102, 3103, 3120, 3130, 
3140, 3170, 3181, 3191, 3195, 3225, 3266, 3301, 3350, 3530, 6021, 6022, 6212, 6315, 6350, 6520, 6560, 
6563, 6821, 9040, 9050, 9140, 9163, 9183, 9252, 9253, 9254, 9405, 9410, 9412, 9421, 9433, 9435, 9570, 
9571, 9635, 9902, 9910, 9911, 9921  
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rate items (e.g., “excited” and “jittery”) on a Likert scale (1=Very slightly or not at all, 
5=Extremely) according to how they feel currently. The scales have excellent convergent 
and divergent correlations with more comprehensive mood measures and high test-retest 
reliability: .81 for NA and .79 for PA (Watson, Clark, & Tellegan, 1998). The Negative 
Affect subscale correlates highly with the Hopkins Symptom Checklist (HSCL) (r=.74) and 
the Positive Affect subscale has a modest negative correlation with the Beck Depression 
Inventory (r=-.34; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996). In the current study, Cronbach’s alpha for 
Positive Affect was .93 and .91 before and after photo exposure, respectively. Cronbach’s 
alpha for Negative Affect was .92 at both time points.  
Recognition test. The recognition test consisted of either three sets of 16 photos or 
three sets of 16 descriptions of photos (e.g., “a young boy points a gun at the viewer”), 
depending on condition. To create photo descriptions, we showed pilot participants from 
Amazon Mechanical Turk a subset of 24 IAPS photos from our larger photo pool and, for 
each photo, asked them to “describe the event depicted in the photograph in one sentence.” 
Using the specific details that were consistently described by participants, three research 
assistants created a fine-grained (i.e., accurate, informative, and descriptive details of the 
photo) description of each photo. For example, “a man holds a knife to a woman’s throat” 
and “two fire fighters pull an unconscious woman out of a smoke filled building”.  We 
eliminated photos with overlapping descriptions or high similarity. For example, one 
photo’s description was “a mutilated, bloody, severed hand rests on a table” while 
another’s was “a wounded right hand that has severe cuts and a compound fracture with 
bones sticking out.” Due to this overlap, we only included one of these photos/descriptions 
in the final sets.  
The test comprised one set of “old” items (i.e., previously presented photos or 
descriptions of photos) and two sets of “new” items (previously unseen photos or 
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descriptions of photos). One set of new items were neutral IAPS photos, or their 
descriptions—included to ensure participants paid attention—and the other set was one of 
our previously unseen target negative photo/description sets. Before completing the test, 
participants read instructions stating that they were about to see some photos (or 
descriptions of photos) and that their task was to identify each as OLD or NEW. We asked 
the description condition to “select OLD if the description is of a photo you saw earlier in 
the session” and “select NEW if the description is of a photo you did not see earlier in the 
session.” We asked photo test participants to “select OLD if you saw the same photo earlier 
in the session” and “select NEW if you did not see the same photo earlier in the session.” 
Participants indicated their confidence in each decision (1=not at all confident, 
10=extremely confident).  
There were twelve versions of the test for both conditions, counterbalanced so that 
every test item appeared equally often as ‘new’ and ‘old’ across participants. For all tests 
photos and descriptions appeared in a random order. 
Procedure 
This research was approved by the Flinders University Social and Behavioural 
Research Ethics Committee and the City University of New York’s University Integrated 
Institutional Review Board and conducted in accordance with the provisions of the World 
Medical Association Declaration of Helsinki. We administered the experiment as an online 
survey using Qualtrics software.  We told participants that the experiment was about juror 
decision-making and would allow us to evaluate how different graphic visual evidence 
affects mock juror decision-making; in particular, whether particularly graphic material 
exacerbates the difficulty for jurors in remaining objective and attending to their task. We 
informed participants in the study advertisement and information form that participation 
involved viewing potentially distressing and graphic images.  
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We randomly assigned participants to receive either a photo test or descriptions test. 
Participants first completed the PANAS. Next, we instructed participants that they were 
about to be shown some photos depicting events, one at a time. Participants then viewed 48 
target photographs in a randomized order. Each photograph appeared for 2.5 seconds. To 
ensure participants attended to the photos, we asked participants to rate each photo on 
emotional arousal (i.e., “How emotionally arousing was the picture?”) immediately after 
the photo’s presentation on a Likert scale (1=not at all, 7=highly). After the encoding 
phase, participants completed the PANAS again and responded to the question “how 
closely did you pay attention to the photos presented?” (1=not at all, 7=extremely closely). 
Participants also rated how disgusting, distressing and unpleasant they found the photos 
(1=not at all, 7=extremely). We also included an attention check following encoding (see 
Oppenheimer, Meyvis & Davidenko, 2009). Specifically, we asked participants to select, 
using a checklist, the sensory impressions they were aware of experiencing while viewing 
the photos. However, embedded within the text was an instruction to ignore the original 
question and simply type a specific word into the "other" free-test box.  Participants who 
failed this check (i.e., did not type the word) were immediately brought to the end of the 
survey, and received a partial payment (90 cents). Data for non-completers were not 
analyzed.  
 Next, participants worked on unrelated Sudoku puzzles for 20 min. We based this 
delay on our previous memory research using IAPS photos (Oulton, Takarangi, & Strange, 
2016), and similar time delays previously used in misinformation studies (e.g., Vornik, 
Sharman, & Garry, 2003; Wright, Self, & Justice, 2000). We then asked participants how 
often they found themselves thinking about the photographs since viewing them (1=almost 
never, 5=extremely frequently). Participants completed the recognition test. Finally, we 
asked participants whether they closed their eyes or looked away from the photos when 
12  
first viewing them. We explicitly informed participants that their answer to this question 
would not affect payment. We debriefed participants at the end of the survey and paid them 
$4.50 for their time. Our data for Experiment 1 can be found on the Open Science 
Framework (OSF) at https://osf.io/6u4wh.  
Results 
Emotional Impact of Photos 
 We first examined the photos’ effect on mood. We compared positive and negative 
affect scores before and after viewing the photos, using 2 (Photo Test, Description Test) x 2 
(Time 1, Time 2) mixed ANOVAs. There were no main effects of test condition (Fs<1). As 
expected, the analyses revealed significant main effects of time for positive (F(1, 
226)=114.97, p<.001, ηp2= .34, 95% CI [.24, .42]) and negative (F(1, 226)=211.15, p<.001, 
ηp2=.48 [.39, .56]) affect. Positive affect significantly reduced (Time 1: M=30.12 [28.90, 
31.35], Time 2: M=25.33 [24.19, 26.48], d= 0.534), while negative affect significantly 
increased following photo exposure (Time 1: M=12.58 [11.94, 13.21], Time 2: M=19.80, 
[18.73, 20.88], d=1.07. These results confirm that the photos negatively affected 
participants’ mood. 
Photo ratings 
Participants rated the photos as very unpleasant (M=6.25, 95% CI [6.10, 6.41]), 
distressing (M=5.72 [5.53, 5.92]) and disgusting (M=5.99 [5.82, 6.16]). Participants 
reported paying very close attention to the photos (M=6.73 [6.64, 6.82]) and thinking about 
them moderately often during the delay period (M=2.50 [2.34, 2.66]; 1= Almost never, 5= 
Extremely frequently). The conditions did not significantly differ on any of these ratings, 
                                                        4 We used ESCI software (Cumming, 2012) to calculate confidence intervals for effect sizes. However, 
because CI calculation is not available for paired sample t-tests with degrees of freedom greater than 200, we 
do not report this information.  
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ps>.05. Thinking about the photos was not significantly related to response bias (r=-.05, 
p=.46) or sensitivity (r=-.11, p=.10).  
Memory Accuracy5 
Next, we turned to our specific hypotheses regarding memory accuracy. Recall that 
we were primarily interested in participants’ ability to distinguish between seen and unseen 
photos, and their bias to respond “old” at test. In particular, we wondered whether test 
format would affect participants’ tendency to respond “old” to test items. To separate 
participants’ ability to distinguish between old and new test items (i.e., sensitivity) from 
their response bias, we used a signal detection method (Stainslaw & Todorov, 1999). We 
classified old photos/descriptions as signal events and new, negative photos/descriptions as 
noise events: correctly identifying an old photo or description as “old” was coded as a hit, 
and incorrectly identifying a new negative photo or description as “old” was coded as a 
false alarm. We calculated signal detection measures d’ and c, where d’ denotes the ability 
to discriminate between old and new test items and c denotes response bias. Note that c < 0 
indicates a response bias toward saying old, and c > 0 is a response bias toward saying new 
to test items. A d’ value of 0 indicates an inability to distinguish old test items from new 
test items, whereas larger values indicate a greater ability to distinguish old test items from 
new test items.  
We had competing predictions about sensitivity. Either the photo test condition 
would be more accurate compared to the description test condition—due to participants 
demanding a distinct recollection of a test item and greater constraint on their 
imagination—or they would be less accurate, due to overlap in perceptual information 
between study and test items. As shown in Figure 1a, our data support the former                                                         5 We examined age and gender as potential moderators for the effect of condition on sensitivity and response 
bias. Results were non-significant for all analyses, all ps>.05. Excluding participants who closed their eyes or 
looked away from the photos (26.8%) did not change the results of the analyses for sensitivity or response 
bias.  
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prediction: participants were significantly better at distinguishing between old and new 
photos, compared to descriptions of old and new photos, t(216.55)=17.84, p < .001, d=2.37, 
95% CI [2.02, 2.70]. These findings are consistent with the assumption that photos, relative 
to descriptions, constrain imagination therefore reducing opportunity for false memories. 
Further, our data suggest that when distinctive perceptual information is available at test, 
people are more accurate at remembering what they have and have not seen.  
We also had competing predictions about response bias. Either photo-test 
participants would be more biased to respond “old”, because of feelings of familiarity that 
arise due to shared perceptual features with previously encoded pictures, or description-test 
participants would show a greater bias because it is easier to retrieve a memory that fits 
with a description. As shown in Figure 1b, the description test condition was significantly 
more biased to respond “old” to the test items compared to the photo test condition, 
t(210.03) = 11.21, p < .001. The effect size was very large according to Cohen’s 
benchmarks, d=1.49, [1.19, 1.78].   
Memory Confidence 
 
Along with memory accuracy and bias, we examined whether test format affected 
participants’ confidence at test. We compared mean confidence scores for Old and New 
negative test items, using a 2 (Photo Test, Description Test) x 2 (Old photos, New photos) 
mixed ANOVA. Participants were significantly more confident when identifying old 
photos (M=8.88, [8.70, 9.06]) compared to new photos (M=7.55, [7.31, 7.79], d=0.82), a 
significant main effect of photo type, F(1, 226)=307.49, p <.001, ηp2=.58, 95% CI [.50, 
.64]. The photo test condition were significantly more confident (M=8.88, [8.71, 9.04]) 
overall when identifying photos compared to the description test condition (M=7.55 [7.33, 
7.76], d=0.87), a main effect of condition, F(1, 226)=60.10, p<.001, ηp2=.21 [.12, .30].  
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 There was also a significant interaction between condition and photo type, F(1, 
226)=13.50, p<.001, ηp2=.06, 95% CI [.01, .12]. Follow-up independent samples t-tests 
revealed that the photo test condition was significantly more confident when identifying old 
photos (M= 9.43, [9.25, 9.61]) compared to the description test condition (M=8.33, [8.05, 
8.60]), t(196.73)=6.60, p<.001, d=0.87, [.60, 1.15]. Similarly, the photo test condition was 
significantly more confident when identifying new photos (M=8.38, [8.10, 8.66]) compared 
to the description test condition (M=6.72, [6.39, 7.05]), t(226)=7.65, p<.001, d=1.01 [.74, 
1.29]. However, the difference in confidence between conditions was greatest for new 
photos. These results fit with our memory accuracy data, suggesting that participants found 
it particularly difficult when deciding whether a New photo description was old or new.  
Conclusions 
Taken together, test format influenced participants’ ability to distinguish between 
old and new test items and their willingness to say a test item was old. Specifically, 
descriptions led to a reduction in memory accuracy and confidence, as well as an enhanced 
response bias towards saying “old” to test items, relative to those given a photo test. These 
findings have important implications: the field research on memory amplification presents 
participants with descriptions of traumatic stressors and this test format may encourage 
participants to endorse trauma exposure. Moreover, because memory amplification arises 
over time, we wondered, do people become more biased to respond yes after a longer 
delay, when trace memory for the original has faded even further? If so, the data would 
support an explanation for memory amplification that is specific to the test format used in 
the field data.  
We therefore ran a second experiment assessing analogue PTSD symptoms with all 
participants completed the description test on two occasions (as in the field research), 24 
hours apart. This amendment allowed us to determine if and how participants’ response 
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bias and sensitivity at test changed over time and whether these changes were related to 
analogue PTSD symptoms. We expected sensitivity would worsen over time, due to 
memory decay. We had competing predictions for response bias. On the one hand, as 
memory traces inevitably weaken over time, people might become more conservative at 
test, due to decreased confidence in their ability to correctly identify photos. We found this 
pattern of data previously, using only a photo test (Oulton et al., 2016). On the other hand, 
in the field research people tend to endorse more trauma exposure over time, perhaps due to 
a motivation to justify one’s rising distress and reinterpretation of event descriptions, for 
example (Engelhard et al., 2000). Thus, we might replicate that pattern, with participants 
becoming even more willing to respond “old” to test items at the second test.  
Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants 
We recruited participants using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk: 111 completed the 
experiment (16 participants (12.6%) failed to complete Session 2). We removed three 
participants who completed the second test more than 24 hours after receiving the test link. 
Our analyses therefore focus on the remaining 108 participants. Participants were US 
residents, aged 22-78 (M=36.19, 95% CI [33.95, 38.44]). Most (56.5%) were male and 
Caucasian (including White; 77.8%). Others identified as Asian American (6.5%), African 
American (including Black; 5.6%), Hispanic (4.6%), European (1.9%), or mixed ethnic 
origin (3.7%). We did not collect any other demographic or socioeconomic data. 
Materials and Procedure 
The experiment consisted of two separate online sessions, approximately 24 hours 
apart. For Session 1, the materials and procedure were identical to Experiment 1. However, 
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all participants received the description test and participants completed an adapted version6 
of the PTSD Checklist for DSM-5 (PCL-5; Weathers et al., 2010) at the end of the survey 
(see also Carleton, Sikorski & Asmundson, 2010; Nixon et al., 2007). Participants rated 
how bothered they were by items describing PTSD symptoms since viewing the photos 
(e.g., repeated, disturbing and unwanted memories of the photos; 0=not at all, 
4=extremely). We used the PCL for DSM-5 to calculate a total symptom severity score, 
along with the four symptom cluster severity scores: re-experiencing (Cluster B), avoidance 
(Cluster C), negative alterations in cognition and mood (Cluster D) and arousal (Cluster E). 
The test-retest reliability of the PCL-5 is high (Keane et al., 2014). The scale has excellent 
convergent validity with the PCL-C and other generalized anxiety disorder scales (Bovin et 
al., 2015).   
Twenty-four hours after the first session, participants received an email with a link 
to Session 2. Within Session 2, participants first completed the PANAS, followed by the 
description recognition test. Consistent with the field research, all test items were exactly 
the same on both occasions (albeit presented in a random order at both time points). 
However, we slightly modified the wording of the test instructions for the second test to 
ensure participants would respond “old” only if they remembered the photo (as opposed to 
the photo’s description). That is, we wanted to avoid participants responding “old” to test 
descriptions, simply because they remembered seeing the same description in the test the 
day before. We asked participants to select old if “the description is of a PHOTO you saw 
yesterday in session 1” and select new if “the description is of a PHOTO you did not see 
yesterday in session 1”. After the test, participants completed the full, 20-item version of                                                         6 For the first administration of the PCL-5 we excluded 6 items that are meaningless for a 20 min delay period 
(i.e., “repeated disturbing dreams of the stressful experience”, “avoiding external reminders of the stressful 
experience”, “loss of interest in activities that you used to enjoy”, “feeling distant or cut off from other 
people”, “taking too many risks or doing things that could cause you harm” “trouble falling or staying 
asleep”). Therefore, the revised scale consisted of 14 items in total. Participants completed the full (20-item) 
version of the scale 24 hours later.  
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the PCL-5 in relation to the photos a second time. At the end of the study participants were 
paid $6.00 for their time. Our data for Experiment 2 can be found on the Open Science 
Framework (OSF) at https://osf.io/6u4wh.  
Results 
Emotional Impact of Photos 
As in Experiment 1, positive affect significantly reduced (Time 1: M=29.54 [27.72, 
31.35], Time 2: M=24.76 [23.27, 26.25]; t(107)= 8.61, p<.001, d=0.55, 95% CI [0.40, 
0.69]) and negative affect significantly increased following photo exposure 7(Time 1: 
M=12.05 [11.22, 12.88], Time 2: M=19.19, [17.62, 20.77]), t(107)=-10.89, p<.001, d=1.08 
[0.84, 1.32].  Before the second test, mean positive affect was significantly lower (27.06 
[25.07, 29.05]) than positive affect prior to encoding, t(107)=5.44, p<.001. However, the 
effect size was small, d=0.25 [0.15, 0.34]. This finding may reflect anticipation of viewing 
negative material or a carryover effect after viewing the negative stimuli. Mean negative 
affect before the second test (M=12.31 [11.41, 13.22]) did not significantly differ from 
mean negative affect before encoding, t(107)=-.74, p=.46. Mean PCL-5 scores (in relation 
to the photos) were significantly lower 24 hours after photo presentation (M=9.07, [6.94, 
11.19]) compared to 20 minutes after photo presentation (M=12.97 [10.82, 15.13]), 
t(106)=4.23, p<.001, d=0.35 [0.18, 0.52].  
Photo ratings 
As in Experiment 1, participants found the photos very unpleasant (M=6.35, 95% 
CI [6.15, 6.55]), distressing (M=5.65 [5.33, 5.96]) and disgusting (M=5.91 [5.65, 6.16]) and 
reported paying very close attention to the photos (M=6.77 [6.68, 6.86]). Participants 
reported thinking about the photos moderately often, when asked 20 minutes after photo 
exposure (M=2.32, 95% CI [2.07, 2.56], 1= Almost never, 5= Extremely frequently)                                                         7 Cronbach’s alpha for positive affect was .92 and .87 before and after photo exposure, respectively. For 
negative affect, cronbach’s alpha was .91 both before and after photo exposure.  
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Memory Accuracy8 
Next, we examined how participants’ response bias and sensitivity changed over 
time. A paired samples t-test revealed that participants’ sensitivity significantly worsened 
over time, t(107)=6.09, p <.001, d=0.46, 95% CI [0.30, 0.62]). As shown in Figure 2a, 
participants became worse at distinguishing old from new items over time. In addition, a 
paired sample t-test revealed that participants became significantly more biased to respond 
“old”—as measured by criterion c—to test items over the 24 hour period, t(107)=6.69, 
p<.001, d=0.47 [0.32, 0.63] (Figure 2b). Thus, replicating the field research, overall 
participants endorsed exposure to more photos at the second assessment compared to the 
first assessment (i.e., their memory amplified).  
Previous field studies have been unable to use a signal detection approach, because 
they do not verify what events participants actually experienced. Therefore, we examined 
reporting discrepancies across time using two other approaches from the memory 
amplification field literature. First, following Southwick et al. (1997), we created variables 
indicating whether each photo was: (1) identified as “old” at both times,  (2) identified as 
“old” initially but later identified as “new”, (3) identified as “new” initially but later 
identified as “old”, and (4) identified as “new” at both time points.  Almost all participants 
(98.1%) changed at least one of their test responses over time; the mean number of 
response changes was 5.43, 95% CI [4.80, 6.05]. A total of 94.4% of participants changed 
at least one of their responses from “new” to “old”, while 66.7% changed at least one 
response from “old” to “new”. These percentages were slightly elevated compared to the 
field studies, particularly for new-old (i.e., no-yes) changes. It should be noted, however, 
that there is great variability across studies for both percentage of no-yes changes (e.g.,                                                         8 We also examined age and gender as potential moderators for the effect of time on response bias and 
sensitivity. Results were non-significant for all analyses, all ps>.05. Excluding participants who closed their 
eyes or looked away from the photos at encoding (16.7%) did not change the pattern of results for sensitivity 
or response bias. 
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70% (Southwick et al., 1997), 40.7% (Krinsley et al.,), 76% (King et al.) and 70% 
(Engelhard et al.,) and yes-no changes observed (e.g., 46% (Southwick et al., 1997), 45.1% 
(Krinsley et al.), 58.3% (King et al.), 80% Engelhard et al.). These discrepancies may 
reflect differences in how exposure items are worded, or differences in the degree of trauma 
exposure across samples. The mean number of New-Old changes was 3.91 [3.33, 4.48] and 
the mean number of Old-New changes was 1.52 [1.23, 1.81].  
Second, following Giosan et al. (2009), we calculated an overall memory change 
score by subtracting the proportion of negative photos (both old and new) endorsed as 
“old” at Time 2 from the number of photos identified as “old” at Time 1. Thus, if people 
remembered more negative photos over time (i.e., memory amplification), their change 
score would be a negative value; if they remembered fewer photos at Time 2 
(‘‘forgetting’’) it would be a positive value. The mean memory change score was -2.39 [-
3.05, -1.73]. That is, on average participants endorsed two additional photos at Time 2. 
Most participants (73.1%) endorsed more photos over time, 15.7% of participants 
decreased the number of photos endorsed and 11.1% endorsed the same number of photos 
at both time points.  
Analogue PTSD Symptoms and Memory Performance 
Next, we examined the relationship between analogue PTSD symptoms and 
memory amplification. Consistent with the field research, we expected that PTSD 
symptoms would be positively associated with endorsing more photo exposure over time. 
Again, we operationalized this change in three ways. We first examined participants’ bias 
to respond “old” to test items: we calculated a change in response bias (or memory 
amplification) score by subtracting c scores at T2 from c scores at T1. Positive values 
represented becoming more biased to respond “new” over time, and negative values 
represented becoming more biased to respond “old” over time (i.e., memory amplification). 
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Seventy-eight participants (72.2%) became more biased to respond “old” over time, 9 
(8.3%) participants’ bias did not change and 21 (19.4%) participants became more biased to 
respond “new”. Consistent with the field research, there was a small, significant negative 
relationship between overall PTSD symptoms at T29 and change in response bias, r = -.20, 
95% CI [-.38, -.01], N = 107, p =.035 (We also calculated the relationship for the PCL 
subscales: re-experiencing: r=-.21 [-.38, -.02], p=.032; avoidance: r=-.16 [-.34, .03], p=.11; 
cognition and mood change: r=-.10 [-.28, .09], p=.33; arousal: r= -.25 [-.42, -.06], p= .01). 
Specifically, the more participants experienced analogue PTSD symptoms in relation to the 
photos, the more biased they became to respond “old” to test items over time. Participants’ 
rating of how frequently they thought about the photos over the first 20 minute delay period 
was not significantly related to change in response bias (r=-.04 [-.22, .16], p=.70). 
However, these ratings were tentatively related to change in sensitivity, r=.19 [.00, .37], 
p=.055. This finding may reflect a rehearsal effect, such that participants who thought 
about the photos more were less likely to forget the photos they had previously viewed.   
We next examined the relationship between analogue PTSD symptoms and 
response changes. Based on the field research (e.g., Engelhard et al., 2008; Southwick et 
al., 1997), we anticipated that the number of New to Old changes would be associated with 
total PCL scores. Indeed, we observed a significant positive correlation with a comparable 
effect size to prior field research, r= .33, p<.001 (re-experiencing: r=.31, p=.001; 
avoidance: r=.17, p=.08, cognition change: r=.28, p=.004; arousal: r=.34, p<.001). Further, 
there were no significant relationships between PTSD symptoms and the 3 other types of 
response change, all ps>.05. Thus, analogue PTSD symptoms were uniquely associated 
with later remembering photos as “old” that were previously remembered as “new”.  
                                                        9 One participant failed to complete the PCL at Time 2. Thus, their data is not included in the correlational 
analyses.  
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Finally, we also found that memory change scores (Giosan et al., 2009) were 
significantly correlated with analogue PTSD symptoms at time 2: that is, an increase in the 
number of endorsed photos at Time 2 was associated with more severe analogue PTSD 
symptoms at follow up, r=-.27 [-.44, -.09], N=107, p=.005.  Echoing this finding, how 
distressing participants’ rated the photos also predicted memory amplification, r = -.21 [-
.38, -.02], p= .026. Interestingly however, there was no significant relationship between 
analogue PTSD symptoms and change in sensitivity, r=.10 [-.09, .28], p=.32. Thus, 
although symptoms appear to play a role in determining participants’ tendency to endorse 
photo exposure, they do not appear to be related to participant’s ability to distinguish 
between what they have and have not seen before. Specifically, the correlations between 
analogue symptoms and change in response bias (Z=2.26, p=.02), and memory change 
scores (Z=2.86, p<.01), but not new-to-old changes (Z=1.73, p=.08), were significantly 
different to the correlation between analogue symptoms and change in sensitivity (Steiger, 
1980). 
Memory Confidence 
Finally, we analyzed how participants’ confidence changed over time. Despite 
sensitivity significantly worsening over time, paired sample t-tests revealed that mean 
confidence did not significantly differ over time for either old (Time 1: M= 8.50 [8.26, 
8.73], Time 2: M= 8.51 [8.29, 8.72]; t(107)=-0.15, p=.88, d=0.01, 95% CI [-0.10, 0.12]) or 
new test items (Time 1: M= 7.06 [6.78, 7.34], Time 2: M= 6.94 [6.64, 7.25]; t(107)=1.23, 
p=.22, d=0.08 [-0.05, 0.20).  
General Discussion 
Our aim was to determine whether test format plays a role in memory amplification. 
In Experiment 1, we showed that using a verbal test format—akin to what is used in the 
field research—led to poorer memory sensitivity, and a greater bias to say “old”, compared 
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to a photo test. Our study is the first to show that, when participants are presented with 
descriptions of highly negative photos, they are more likely to endorse never seen photos, 
than when they are re-exposed to negative photos in the same modality as encoding. This 
finding is important, because trauma exposure assessments are typically descriptions. In 
Experiment 2—analyzing memory consistency according to the variety of methods that 
have been employed in the literature to date—we reliably demonstrated that participants 
were inconsistent in their responses over time, and endorsed more photo exposure at Time 
2. This pattern fits with the field research on memory amplification (e.g., Engelhard et al., 
2008; King et al., 2000; Southwick et al., 1997), and has the additional benefit that we were 
able to verify photo exposure. 
The results from Experiment 1 suggest event descriptions give reign to imagination, 
and generally lack the perceptual information inherent to a traumatic event. Thus, when 
people judge whether an event description happened to them, they must determine how 
similar that description is to their actual experience, rather than judging a verbatim 
stimulus. Of course, one could argue that people sometimes incorrectly endorsed a 
description they thought was of a photo they actually saw, inflating our error / bias rate in 
this condition. However, we were careful to only use descriptions of discrete and 
discriminable (compared to subjective) photographs; after pilot testing, we removed any 
descriptions that could apply to more than one photo. Further, some of the field research 
has used subjective descriptions (e.g., “extreme threat to your personal safety”, “witnessing 
violence”) that could plausibly apply to multiple events, likely inflating their memory 
amplification rate (e.g., Engelhard et al., 2008; Southwick et al., 1997).  
The finding that memory amplification itself may be malleable has methodological, 
practical and theoretical implications. For example, the size of the memory amplification 
effect observed in previous research may—at least partially—reflect the method by which 
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memory is tested. Indeed, inconsistencies in people’s responses to questions about their 
experience might not always represent distortion of memory per se but may be a feature of 
the test format. In particular, descriptions of trauma used in exposure checklists may be 
especially vulnerable to reinterpretation and response biases, and these biases may magnify 
over time, as we showed in Experiment 2. To illustrate, if a veteran initially says they don’t 
remember seeing friends killed or injured and later responds that they do remember, this 
change could represent the creation of a new event memory—as field studies often 
assume—or it could reflect how the victim approached the test. They may be relying more 
on gist memory and vague impressions of similarity between survey items and their past 
experience, be more motivated to search their memory for what happened to them during 
service or be re-interpreting the meaning of the word “friend”.   
Practically speaking, even if reporting discrepancies do not always represent 
changes in a person’s memory of what happened, they still have implications for real world 
trauma reporting and prognosis. For example, researchers and clinicians often consider 
checklists to be objective indices of true trauma exposure and PTSD to be a direct outcome 
of that exposure. Our findings strongly suggest that assumption is simply not accurate. 
Instead, our results align with a memory-based model of PTSD (Rubin, Berntsen, & 
Johansen, 2008) whereby PTSD symptoms derive from one’s current memory of the 
negative event and not the event per se. Importantly—like all memories—the trauma 
memory is subject to alteration and distortion.  
In Experiment 2, we found that memory amplification was consistently related to 
analogue PTSD symptoms; a finding that parallels the field and laboratory research. There 
are several possible reasons for this relationship. One is that people experiencing more 
severe symptomology at T2 are more motivated to recall negative photos that help them 
justify and make sense of these symptoms (Engelhard et al., 2008), and to reinterpret events 
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to fit with their symptom profile. Another, related, possibility is that people with PTSD 
symptoms are unable or unwilling to determine exactly what they witnessed, relying on 
heuristic processing (i.e., rapid, non-strategic decisions) at test. For example, distressed 
people might frequently mistake imagined details about the trauma with what they actually 
witnessed, because they base their decisions on the qualitative characteristics (e.g., degree 
of perceptual detail) of activated memories. Similarly, people with PTSD may retrieve less 
specific-representations, and rely more on the gist of what they experience (Engelhard et 
al., 2008). Hence, vague impressions of similarity between checklist items and their 
experience could result in false recognition and a response bias toward endorsing trauma. 
In the context of our paradigm, participants with many intrusive memories about the photos 
may have been less inclined to search their memory for specific representations of the 
photos shown (to avoid the negative feelings/symptoms associated with thinking about the 
images) and, therefore, responded “old” to any photos that were similar to the general gist 
of the photos shown at encoding. Indeed, we found the re-experiencing symptoms of PTSD 
were most strongly associated with a change in bias toward responding “old” over time, 
supporting this proposal. Of course, it is also possible a third variable—a liberal response 
threshold or general tendency for over-reporting—better explains the relationship between 
PTSD symptoms and memory amplification. Albeit a challenging task, future research 
might test this possibility by including a third variable that assesses an emotional response 
that is unrelated to our key variables.  
Taken together then, our findings suggest that test format contributes to memory 
amplification, but the strength of this effect may depend on the presence and strength of 
PTSD symptoms. In particular, people with more severe PTSD symptoms may be more 
likely to show a pronounced amplification effect when test format is verbal—due, for 
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example, to a need to justify distress or a reliance on heuristic processing—compared to 
participants who are relatively asymptomatic and less likely to exhibit these tendencies. 
Of course, our experiments have limitations. Using a trauma analogue means that 
our conclusions may lack generalizability. Although participants rated the photos as very 
unpleasant and distressing, viewing negative photos clearly does not provoke the same 
degree of fear as a real trauma.  Relatedly, unlike traumatic events in the field, there was 
obviously no threat to life or safety. Further, unfortunately our data do not allow us to 
determine the direction of the relationship between PTSD and amplification; we cannot 
determine whether people develop symptoms in response to an amplified memory, or 
whether memory amplification causes more symptoms. Finally, because we did not use a 
remember/know judgment, or directly assess whether participants were using gist-based 
retrieval, we cannot infer whether participants were using recollection or familiarity (or 
gist) memory, to guide their decisions. Thus, we are limited in the conclusions we can draw 
about the precise mechanism driving the effects of test format we observed.  
Considering our key findings, and limitations in the inferences that we can make 
from these findings, we would suggest several areas for future research attention. First, we 
think it important to directly assess the specific strategies participants adopt when 
endorsing (or not) trauma events. Thus, future research using an analogue paradigm to 
investigate memory amplification could use remember-know judgments to examine 
whether participants respond “old” because they genuinely remember an image or because 
it seems familiar or matches the general gist of what they have seen before. It may also be 
important to add an incentive for recognition accuracy, or examine reaction time, to 
evaluate whether motivation or effort play a role in memory amplification. Second, we 
need to know more about the characteristics or processes that could increase the familiarity 
of not-experienced items. For example, a measure of imagination—about the photos 
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themselves and/or participants’ trait ability and tendency to imagine or fantasize—would 
help us to determine whether individual differences in degree of imagination explain the 
effects of test format we observed. Also, analyzing the content of any intrusive thoughts 
participants experience over the delay period may help to elucidate whether people imagine 
information beyond the content of photos. Third, because our experiments do not allow us 
to separate out a response bias determined by some other less relevant cause, future 
research could ‘simulate’ the memory amplification effect by modifying participants’ 
report criteria for responding old or new—such as by varying the proportion of old items on 
the test to increase the likelihood participants respond old (e.g., Rhodes & Jacoby, 2007). 
This method would allow us to test whether other factors—such as whether someone is 
currently distressed, or has a PTSD diagnosis—increase susceptibility to such a response 
bias manipulation. Finally, as a methodological point, including comparison positive and/or 
neutral stimuli would determine whether our findings are specific to stimuli that elicit 
negative arousal or whether they reflect a general memory phenomenon.  
Taken together, our data show that the test format typically adopted in memory 
amplification research is vulnerable to response bias and memory errors. Critically, these 
biases and errors enhance as memory traces weaken over time and people with PTSD 
symptoms are particularly susceptible to this enhancement.  Thus, our findings are the first 
to suggest that test format plays a role in memory amplification. 
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a)                                                                           b) 
 
Figure 1. Mean sensitivity (a) and mean response bias (b) by condition.  Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. Increasing negative response bias values represent an 
increasing bias towards responding “OLD” to test items. 
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a)                                                                   b) 
 
Figure 2. Mean sensitivity (a) and mean response bias (b) at Time 1and Time 2. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
